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Abstract 
 
The inequality of wealth in China has increased rapidly in recent years. Prior to 1978 all Chinese 
households possessed negligible wealth. China therefore presents a fascinating case study of how 
inequality of household wealth increases as economic reforms take place, marketization occurs, 
and capital accumulates. Wealth inequality and its growth are measured and decomposed using 
data from two national sample surveys of the China Household Income Project (CHIP) relating 
to 2002 and 2013. Techniques are devised and applied to measure the sensitivity of wealth 
inequality to plausible assumptions about the under-representation of and the under-reporting by 
the wealthy. An attempt is made to explain the rising wealth inequality in terms of the 
relationships between income and wealth, house price inflation, differential savings, and income 
from wealth. 
Keywords: China, wealth inequality and its decomposition, top-tail income corrections, 
relationships between income and wealth, house price inflation, differential savings, income 
from wealth 
JEL Classification: C80, D31, P20 
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I. Introduction 
Which country in the world has the most dollar billionaires?  If you are willing to believe the 
Hurun Rich List 2016 and its sources, the answer is China, with 570 (470 in the mainland), now 
surpassing the United States by 30 billionaires. Which city in the world has the most dollar 
billionaires? The answer is Beijing, with 100, now exceeding even New York. Is this a matter for 
national pride or for policy concern? 
     Our main argument is that the inequality of wealth in China has increased rapidly in recent 
years. Prior to the economic reforms that began in 1978, all Chinese households possessed 
negligible wealth. China therefore presents a fascinating case study of how inequality of wealth 
increases rapidly as economic reforms take place, marketization occurs, and capital accumulates. 
Wealth inequality and its growth deserve examination using data from two twenty-first century 
China Household Income Project (CHIP) surveys.  
     We proceed as follows. Section 2 of this chapter sets out the relevant literature on wealth 
inequality. Section 3 outlines the possible reasons why inequality is hypothesized to have 
increased. Section 4 explains the two, comparable, data sets that will be used to test the 
hypotheses. Owing to the economic differences between urban and rural China and the 
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differences in survey design and implementation, throughout we distinguish urban and rural 
wealth as well as the reporting of national wealth. The national wealth estimates require a 
weighting of the urban and rural samples.  
     In Section 5 we examine the level and structure of wealth in our two survey years, 2002 
and 2013, and its growth during that period. Section 6 measures the distribution of wealth in the 
two years, by decile and by other indicators of inequality. This leads to a decomposition of 
wealth inequality in the two years in Section 7. Section 8 contrasts the urban and rural sectors, 
distinguishing between- and within-sector wealth inequality.  
     Section 9 attempts to explain the results, by examining the processes by which wealth 
inequality increased during the eleven years.  Several hypotheses are tested. Section 10 
provides two estimates of wealth inequality in 2013—both without and with corrections for 
under-reported wealth at the top of the wealth distribution. Section 11 explores the implications 
of the research and presents out conclusions. 
 
II. Literature 
 
Little has been written on the inequality of wealth in China, mainly because of the lack of data. 
During the pre-reform period China had virtually no private property or personal wealth. 
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However, the economic reforms—relating to land use, housing, finance, entrepreneurship, and so 
forth—allowed Chinese people to become property owners. The changes were rapid, making it 
difficult to keep up with the accurate collection of data. 
     McKinley (1993) and Brenner (2001) analyze the inequality of rural (net) wealth using the 
1988 and 1995 CHIP surveys respectively. Rural households did not (and do not) own their land; 
they merely had (and have) use of land—holding it on long leases. Nor was there an active rental 
market during the initial stages of the reforms. The value of land to the household had to be 
calculated based on the output from their land. The policy of ensuring rough per capita equality 
of land holding within a local community made land “ownership” an equalizing force. Financial 
assets had a disequalizing effect on total wealth but the effect was small as financial assets 
accounted for only 3 percent of wealth in 1988 and 11 percent in 1995. When measured on a 
comparable basis, the Gini coefficient of wealth in rural China rose from 0.30 in 1988 to 0.35 in 
1995. 
     Urban analysis became possible only after the privatization of urban housing, which began 
in the early 1990s and was largely completed in the late 1990s. The first urban study was based 
on the 1995 CHIP survey (Gustafsson, Li, and Zhong 2006). Only 42 percent of households 
reported a positive housing value: the urban wealth Gini reflected the housing inequality at this 
time of ongoing privatization. Official selling prices to urban resident households were very low 
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and simply based on the house area and not the quality or location.  But as market prices were 
established, values became more unequal. In 1995 the ratio of the market price to the official 
selling price averaged 7.7 to 1 (Zhao and Ding 2008, p. 128). Inequality of housing values was 
created because housing had been allocated according to official rank and political power. The 
windfall gains meant that housing was owned unequally.  
     Li and Zhao (2007) and Zhao and Ding (2008) examine rural, urban, and national wealth 
inequality by drawing on the 2002 CHIP survey, and Sato, Sicular, and Yue (2013) uses the 2007 
CHIP survey to examine housing inequality. Xie and Jin (2015) estimate China’s inequality of 
household wealth per capita by means of the China Family Panel Study (CFPS) survey of 2012. 
However, China’s degree of wealth inequality and its evolution deserve additional research 
attention as this inequality has become more pronounced, more obvious, and more politically 
important.  
        Our analysis in much of this chapter, based on household micro data, is relatively 
descriptive. Thomas Piketty recently published an important book entitled Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century (2014). In it he analyzes why inequality of wealth has risen in Western 
countries since about 1980 and—as he predicts— it will continue to rise. Central to Piketty’s 
argument is the fact that wealth increases more rapidly than income and that it increases more 
rapidly for those who are wealthier.  His data sources, such as statistics on estates and income 
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tax, differ from our sources. Nevertheless, in Section 9 by means of the household surveys we 
shall attempt to examine whether his ideas have relevance to China.  
 
III. China’s Rising Inequality of Wealth and its Possible Causes 
Table 4.1 reports the basic facts about national wealth inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient. Wealth inequality is shown both on a household basis (the first three columns) and 
on a household per capita basis (the last three columns). The Gini coefficient of household 
wealth per capita is generally 3 or 5 percentage points higher than the household wealth per 
household. Consider the per capita results. The Gini coefficient expressed in nominal terms rose 
from 0.51 to 0.62 over the period.1 Expressing 2002 wealth in 2013 consumer prices makes 
slight difference: the 2002 Gini falls by only about one percentage point. However, when wealth 
is corrected for province, urban, and rural consumer price differences (based on Brandt and Holz 
[2006] and adjusted to our two years), the 2002 Gini becomes 0.45 and the 2013 Gini becomes 
0.57. Wealth inequality did indeed increase sharply, by some 11 or 12 Gini percentage points, 
over these eleven years, i.e. by about one percentage point a year. 
[Table 4.1 about here] 
                              
1 The Gini of 0.62 in 2013 contrasts with a Gini of 0.76 in 2010 obtained by Li and Wan (2015) 
using the CFPS Survey 2010. This high figure is sensitive to the inclusion of some 300 implausibly 
or suspiciously large housing values. If they are excluded, the Gini falls by some ten percentage 
points.  
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     To put China’s inequality of wealth in international perspective we draw on Davies et al. 
(2008).  The authors’ report estimates for the Gini coefficient of household wealth in major 
economies, centering around the year 2000. The degree of wealth inequality is generally higher 
than that of income inequality. China’s unadjusted Gini of 0.62 in 2013 is exceeded by no fewer 
than twenty of the twenty-six countries. The average value of the Gini for all the countries is 
0.68. China’s degree of wealth inequality is moderated by its remarkably high rate of home 
ownership in both urban and rural areas, as compared to most other countries, and by its 
relatively high— almost universal—rates of land “ownership” in the rural areas. The inequality 
of wealth in China is not exceptional. What might be exceptional, however, is its rate of increase. 
     A combination of several factors might be responsible for this rising inequality of wealth. 
China has experienced very rapid physical capital accumulation: since 2000 the proportion of 
GDP that is invested has generally exceeded 40 percent. Wealth has therefore risen rapidly: the 
question is whether the increase in wealth has accrued unequally among households.  
     Inequality of household income per capita has grown rapidly, with the Gini coefficient 
rising from 0.42 in 2002 to 0.49 in 2007. It fell to 0.43 in 2013 but this was mainly because the 
ratio of urban to rural incomes narrowed: within both urban and rural China inequality rose (see 
Chapter 2). If wealth is positively related to income, the rise in income inequality over the 2002–
2013 period might have contributed to the rise in wealth inequality. 
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     A relative rise in the price of wealth goods—property, and especially housing—enriched 
those who held wealth and enriched most those who held the most wealth. China has experienced 
a great surge in housing prices, and this is likely to have increased the inequality of housing 
wealth. Financial markets in China remain imperfect, thus providing opportunities to acquire 
wealth for those with preferential access to funds or with the ability to save a high proportion of 
their income. If the savings rate is positively related to income, this provides a channel that is 
likely to disequalize wealth holding. 
     The share of profits in national income was high throughout the period, at 37 percent in 
2007 (Knight and Ding 2012, p. 164). Some profits accrued to the state, some profits accrued to 
shareholders, and some profits were saved. Some of these savings raised the value of personal 
holdings of company shares. If shareholding were unequally distributed among households, 
paid-out profits and capital gains would probably have contributed to the rising inequality of 
household wealth in China. If there is a higher savings rate out of income from wealth than out 
of other income, that too could have increased wealth inequality. 
      Such hypotheses to explain the observed rise in inequality of wealth are examined in 
Section 9. 
 
IV. The Data 
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We decided to compare wealth inequality using the 2002 CHIP and the 2013 CHIP national 
surveys. We opted for 2002 rather than 2007 because the 2002 CHIP survey is the first 
comprehensive data source on wealth and because it is more interesting to take a longer-term 
view of trends in wealth.  However, the 2002 and 2013 data had to be as comparable as possible. 
Fortunately, the variables relating to wealth are very similar in the two surveys. Thus, the 
estimates of wealth distribution can be compared given the appropriate weightings. The 
weightings used were almost the same as those applied in the CHIP 2002 and the CHIP 2013 
surveys to achieve national representativeness.2  
     Nevertheless, various issues still had to be resolved. Some issues were simple to deal with. 
For instance, because the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) changed its definition of “migrants” 
in 2012, we reclassified the affected 2013 migrants to be comparable with the 2002 migrants. All 
provinces in each survey are covered, with one exception. Because the 2013 Xinjiang sample 
lacks information on wealth, both Xinjiang samples are excluded. Thus, twenty-one provinces 
are included in 2002 and fourteen provinces are included in 2013. 
                              
2 The CHIP samples were stratified by two criteria: urban/rural and Eastern/Central/Western. A set 
of sampling weights was created based on the population numbers in each stratum in 2002 and in 
2013. Our samples are representative of the urban and rural areas of the provinces, and representative 
within each province. 
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     Other issues were more difficult to resolve.  Valuing wealth—and especially housing and 
land wealth—inevitably encounters problems. Net housing is the housing value minus housing 
loans. This is based on the respondents’ reported values (of both owner-occupied homes and 
other homes) in each year, despite the weakness of the housing market in rural China.  
     No information was gathered in the surveys on the asset value of rural land: households 
merely have user rights to their land. It is possible to base the valuation of rural land (defined as 
cultivated land, pastures, and forests) on the reported net agricultural income. As is explained in 
the Appendix describing the components of wealth, the formula for the conversion from net 
agricultural income to the value of rural land is based on previous research findings. Land assets 
in urban areas are defined as zero.  
     The missing values had to be interpolated. For instance, when a housing value is missing, 
the imputation of the housing value is based on the price per square meter at the local (county, 
city, municipality, or district) level. Local averaging is also used for the missing financial assets. 
Where the value of net income from agricultural operations is missing, we use the county-level 
value. Where the consumer durables are listed but not valued, they are valued by using the local 
consumer durable prices, derived from the households that reported both the values and the 
quantities.  
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     Comparative real wealth is obtained by reflating the 2002 nominal wealth by the NBS 
consumer price indexes to express the 2002 values in 2013 prices. We use the province-level 
consumer price indexes, distinguishing also between the urban and the rural indexes. Throughout 
this chapter our discussion of wealth is real wealth, i.e., measured at 2013 constant CPI-adjusted 
prices. The concept of most interest is not the total household wealth but the household wealth 
per capita. Thus, when we refer to the term “wealth,” we are referring to real household wealth 
per capita. 
 It will become evident below that the growth of housing wealth has made a considerable 
contribution to the growth of inequality of household wealth. It is therefore important to examine 
the role of inflation of housing prices in this process. The task is complicated by the fact that our 
two data sets do not constitute a panel.  
     Two approaches were tried. One was to use data published by the Ministry of Housing and 
Construction, which show the value of sales of commercial buildings, and the corresponding sold 
floor space, at the district and county levels. From this information, it was possible to construct a 
housing inflation index. The other approach was to calculate housing prices from the CHIP 
surveys for each of the urban and rural areas within each included province. Districts within 
cities were used in the case of the metropolitan areas.  Reflecting the data available, each 
subsample was divided into ranked subgroups based on the average house value per square meter, 
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and these subgroups in 2002 and 2013 were compared. If an area was not included in both years 
another location with very similar housing prices was substituted. The resultant house price 
inflation index was then applied to all households in each area. The robustness tests were passed. 
The results obtained by the two approaches were similar. Our estimates of inflation of housing 
prices are based on the second approach.  
     Because wealth in 2002 and 2013 is calculated in real terms using 2013 constant prices, 
and 2002 housing prices are already reflected in the consumer price index, it would be incorrect 
to make this adjustment twice. Therefore, our interest is in the relative inflation of housing prices, 
measured by the inflation of housing prices divided by the inflation of consumer prices. 
     At several points in this chapter household wealth is related to household income, both 
expressed in per capita terms. We follow the CHIP income definition in the 2013 survey, with 
the exception that imputed rents on owner-occupied housing are not included. Partly due to the 
NBS statistical reform in 2012, income in 2002 and income in 2013 was defined differently. We 
adjusted the 2002 definition of income to be consistent with the 2013 definition. 
     We confine our analysis to the rural and urban samples of the CHIP. Although there was a 
rural-urban migrant sample in both 2002 and 2013, the 2002 migrant questionnaire contained 
little information related to income and, especially, to wealth. Since our objective is to examine 
the rise in wealth inequality between the two years and to determine its causes, it is necessary to 
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exclude rural-urban migrants from the analysis. Insofar as the rural surveys include households 
containing absent migrants, their wealth is covered by the rural questionnaire. 
 
V.  The Level and Growth of Wealth, 2002 and 2013 
 
Table 4.2 has six columns: the first three (A‒C) relate to the level of wealth per capita in 2002, 
the next two (D and E) refer to the level of wealth in 2013, and the final column (F, derived from 
D and B) shows the real annual growth rate of wealth over the eleven years. National, urban, and 
rural wealth per capita are shown separately, and wealth is reported by type as well as total 
wealth. 
[Table 4.2 about here] 
      We begin with urban wealth. Overall real net wealth per capita grew 16.8 percent per 
annum. The fastest growth is seen in net housing (19.4 percent), followed by consumer durables 
and productive fixed assets. Further insight is obtained in Table 4.3, which shows the structure 
of household wealth during the two years. We see that the share of urban net housing in total 
urban wealth rose from 62 percent in 2002 to 78 percent in 2013. This was the most striking 
change. The next largest share was financial assets, but this share fell from 27 percent to 14 
percent.  
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[Table 4.3 about here] 
      Total net wealth per capita in rural China grew by 14.1 percent per annum (Table 4.2). 
This growth rate was fastest for net housing (17.9 percent), followed by financial assets (16.6 
percent). Again, net housing was the predominant form of wealth holding, rising from 41 
percent to 59 percent of the total (Table 4.3). The share of land wealth fell drastically, from 29 
percent to 10 percent of the total. 
     Similar patterns are to be found at the national level. Overall net wealth per capita 
increased by 16.7 percent per annum, and net housing increased fastest (20.1 percent). The share 
of net housing rose from 53 percent to 73 percent of the total. Clearly, housing plays a significant 
role in China’s accumulation of wealth. It will be important to explore whether it also plays a 
leading role in the rising inequality of wealth. 
 
VI.  The Distribution of Wealth, 2002 and 2013 
 
The distribution of household wealth by wealth per capita decile is reported in Table 4.4. 
Consider first the urban decile shares. Remarkably, the poorest wealth decile of households held 
0.44 percent of the total wealth in 2002 and 0.58 percent in 2013. By contrast, the richest decile 
owned 32 percent in 2002 and 42 percent in 2013, a rise of 10 percentage points.  In fact, only 
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the top decile experienced a substantial increase in its share over the period. A similar pattern is 
found in rural China. The top decile increased its share from 29 percent to 43 percent, and the 
shares of the lowest eight deciles fell. At the national level, the share of the richest decile rose 
from 37 percent to 48 percent and gain the share of the lowest nine deciles fell.  
[Table 4.4 about here] 
     The final column of Table 4.4 reports the national wealth per capita by decile. The ratio of 
the highest to the lowest decile was 32 times in 2002 and no less than 91 times in 2013. The ratio 
of the tenth to the ninth decile rose from 2.0 to 2.9.  
     Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 show the Lorenz curves for wealth per capita of urban, rural, and 
national households. In each case, the 2013 curve is more bowed than the 2002 curve throughout 
its range, indicating a rise in inequality throughout the wealth distribution.  
[Figure 4.1 about here] 
[Figure 4.2 about here] 
[Figure 4.3 about here] 
     Table 4.5 reduces the Lorenz curve to a single figure, that is, the Gini coefficient. In urban 
China, the Gini coefficient increased by 9 percentage points, from 0.47 to 0.56 over the eleven 
years. In rural China, the increase was even greater, by 17 percentage points, from 0.38 to 0.55. 
Rural wealth inequality was almost the same as urban wealth inequality in 2013, whereas the 
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rural Gini was lower (by 9 percentage points) in 2002. The national Gini (rising from 0.49 to 
0.62) exceeded both the urban and rural Ginis because of the difference between the average 
urban and the average rural household wealth per capita extends the wealth range. 
[Table 4.5 about here] 
[Table 4.6 about here] 
     Table 4.6 illustrates the degree of sensitivity of the Gini coefficient to the upper and lower 
tails of the wealth distribution. It highlights the importance of the share of the top wealth decile, 
both in terms of its level and in terms of its rise. In 2002 the Gini coefficient of wealth inequality 
fell by 11 percentage points if the top decile is excluded from the sample, and in 2013 by no less 
than 15 percentage points, from 0.62 down to 0.47. 
     Relating the share of wealth to income deciles instead of wealth deciles, Table 4.7 reports 
the share held by each household income per capita decile. With only a trivial exception, there is 
a monotonic rise in this share with income per capita. For instance, at the national level, in 2002 
the share of the lowest income per capita decile was 2.9 percent and that of the highest decile 
26.6 percent, and in 2013 the share varied from 2.9 percent to 36.1 percent. The ninth decile and 
especially the tenth decile increased their share of total wealth in all three cases. Figure 4.4 
shows clearly how inequality of wealth among income groups increased in the urban, rural and 
national samples.  
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[Table 4.7 about here] 
[Figure 4.4 about here] 
 
VII.  Decomposition of Wealth Inequality, 2002 and 2013 
 
Table 4.8 (2002) and Table 4.9 (2013) employ the standard method for the decomposition of 
inequality among the different components, in this case forms of wealth holding. In each table, 
the first column shows the share of each item in total wealth, the second column shows the Gini 
coefficient for that item, and the third column shows the concentration rate, reflecting the 
correlation between the income of that item and the total income. The final column is derived 
from the product of these three variables, yielding the result of most interest: the contribution of 
each item to overall wealth inequality.  
[Table 4.8 about here] 
[Table 4.9 about here] 
     We examine first the urban results. Net housing makes by far the greatest contribution to 
wealth inequality in 2002 (66 percent). It is followed by financial assets (24 percent). Productive 
fixed assets are very unequally held but their contribution to total wealth inequality is small (3 
percent) owing to their small share of the total. The contribution of net housing was as high as 83 
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percent in 2013, increasing because all three components—its share of wealth, its concentration 
rate, and its Gini coefficient—rose. The contribution of financial assets fell over the period (to 11 
percent) because its share of total wealth fell. Other wealth assets contributed only 6 percent to 
the total inequality of wealth. The extreme importance of housing in explaining the inequality of 
urban wealth is clear.  
     Housing made the largest contribution also to the rural wealth inequality. Its contribution 
increased from 48 percent in 2002 to 65 percent in 2013. By contrast, the contribution of land 
fell from 17 percent to 5 percent, essentially because the share of land in the total rural wealth 
fell. The contributions of other wealth assets were both minor and stable.  
     The urban and rural results are reflected in the national pattern. The contribution of net 
housing rose, at 64 percent in 2002 and 78 percent in 2013. The only other form of wealth 
holding of importance was financial assets, and its contribution fell from 25 percent to 13 percent, 
reflecting the rising contribution of net housing. 
 
VIII. Wealth Inequality Within and Between the Urban and Rural Sectors 
 
Table 4.10 uses the Theil index of inequality because, unlike the Gini, it can decompose 
inequality precisely into between-group and within-group inequality. The groups in this case are 
20 
 
urban and rural China. In 2002 within-group inequality of household wealth per capita accounted 
for 78 percent of national wealth inequality, and between-group inequality accounted for the 
remaining 22 percent. In 2013 the contributions were 75 percent and 25 percent respectively. The 
proportions of the total contributed by within-urban wealth inequality and within-rural wealth 
inequality fell a little, whereas the contribution by the difference between urban and rural wealth 
rose correspondingly. The key point, however, is that the Theil index, and both of its components, 
rose substantially between 2002 and 2013. 
[Table 4.10 about here] 
     In both years the national Gini coefficient exceeded both the urban and the rural Gini 
coefficient because the difference between urban and rural household wealth per capita extended 
the wealth range. Recall that in 2002 the national, urban, and rural Gini coefficients for 
household wealth per capita were 0.49. 0.47, and 0.38 respectively, and in 2013 the 
corresponding values were 0.62, 0.56, and 0.55. 
     The ratio of urban to rural wealth per capita increased over the period, from 2.69 to 3.20. 
This widening spatial wealth disparity contributed to the rise in national wealth inequality. That 
is consistent with the absolute rise (from 0.10 to 0.18) and the rise in the share (from 22.5 
percent to 24.9 percent) of between-group inequality in the Theil index. The findings for the 
wealth Gini contrast with those for the income Gini: the urban-rural disparity in income per 
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capita narrowed after 2007, and this was mainly responsible for the fall in China’s income Gini 
during the period from 2007 to 2013 (see Chapter 2). 
 
IX.  Explaining the Results 
A. The Wealth-Income Ratio 
How does wealth relate to income? Do households with higher income per capita have 
proportionately higher wealth per capita? If that is the case, what are the mechanisms that 
produce this result? Table 4.11 shows the wealth/income ratio by income decile (both expressed 
in per capita terms) in 2002 and 2013. This information is more easily absorbed by examining 
Figure 4.5. Causation cannot be attributed to the relationship: causation might run from income 
to wealth or from wealth to income, or in both directions. Nevertheless, the results are 
informative. 
[Table 4.11 about here] 
[Figure 4.5 about here] 
     We see from the figure that in 2002 the wealth/income ratio was very similar for the urban, 
rural, and national samples. The ratio was highest for the poorest income decile but beyond the 
second decile the ratio was constant, declining only slightly. In China as a whole the average 
ratio was 4.9. The high ratio for the poorest two income deciles might be due to the egalitarian 
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system of land holding and the possibility that income fluctuations raised the ratio of wealth (for 
instance, land and housing) relative to the income of households with temporary income poverty 
(for example, instances of negative net income). The analysis by income decile reveals a 
relationship that might otherwise be obscured. 
     The wealth/income ratio was generally higher in 2013, notably for the poorest and the 
richest households. In particular, the urban ratio increased beyond the median income level, and 
the same U-shape is seen in the national sample. A tendency for the wealth/income ratio to rise 
with income (beyond a low-income level) is observable in 2013 but not in 2002. The country’s 
wealth/income ratio in 2013 was 7.4, having increased rapidly—by no less than 2.5—over the 
eleven years. China’s ratio then exceeded the private wealth/income ratio in the developed 
economies, which generally varied between 5 and 6 (Piketty 2014, p. 50). 
     The same exercise is conducted for the housing wealth/income ratio in Table 4.12. Again, 
the patterns are best absorbed in Figure 4.6.  In 2002 the ratio is highest for the poorest income 
decile, it is similar for all three cases, and it is constant beyond the second decile. For the 2013 
sample, the middle deciles are pivotal. Beyond them, the rural ratio is constant but the urban 
ratio, and thus also the national ratio, tend to rise. Thus, there is a tendency for the housing 
wealth/income ratio to rise with income decile in the upper half of the urban and national income 
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distribution.3 Over the period from 2002 to 2013 the housing wealth of households outpaced 
their incomes in China as a whole.  
[Table 4.12 about here] 
[Figure 4.6 about here] 
[Table 4.13 about here] 
     Table 4.13 reports the growth of real wealth per capita by income per capita decile, as does 
Figure 4.7. In the rural sample, the lowest decile shows the highest growth rate, but in the urban 
and national samples it is the highest decile that grows the fastest. In the national and urban 
samples, the growth rate rises after the third or fourth decile, and in the rural sample the growth 
rate rises after the sixth decile. There is a tendency for China’s income-rich to become relatively 
wealth-richer. 
[Figure 4.7 about here] 
 
B. The Role of House Price Inflation 
                              
3 The curious fall in the ratio in the 2013 rural sample is likely to have an institutional explanation, e.g., 
the difficulty of owning more than one house in the village or the difficulty of reporting a market-based 
rather than a cost-based value. 
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Table 4.14 divides the increase in housing wealth into that part which is due to relative house 
price inflation and that part which is due to a real increase in housing. However, our measure of 
relative house price inflation necessarily includes the value of house improvements per square 
meter: it is not a pure price effect. Thus, the real increase (the increase in housing quantity) 
represents an increase in the average number of square meters reported. Insofar as part of the 
increase in house values is due to housing improvements, these improvements represent a form 
of wealth holding that yields high returns to the investment. 
[Table 4.14 about here] 
     In China as a whole, after eliminating the effect of relative house price inflation (74.3 
percent of the increase), 25.7 percent is due to the increase in the volume of housing wealth. We 
see that the proportions in both urban and rural China are similar to the national case. Much of 
China’s rapid growth in housing wealth can be attributed to a relative increase in house values. 
     The effect of relative house price inflation seems important enough to examine its effect 
on the growth of household wealth as a whole. Thus, Table 4.15 divides the change in household 
wealth over the eleven years into that part which is due to house price inflation (relative to 
consumer price inflation) and other factors. In urban China, 62.4 percent of the rise in household 
wealth is due to (relative) inflation of house prices and 37.6 percent is due to other factors. In 
rural China, we see that 46.5 percent of the rise resulted from relative house price inflation and 
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53.5 percent resulted from other factors. At the national level, 56.9 percent of the increase in 
household wealth reflects the relative house price index and 43.1 percent reflects other influences. 
We see the significant importance of relative house price inflation for the growth of household 
wealth in China. 
     Figure 4.8 shows the housing price (per square meter) in 2002 on the horizontal axis, with 
regions (county, city, or district of municipality) of the country, ordered from the lowest priced 
region in 2002 on the left to the highest priced on the right; the prices (in 10,000 yuan) range 
from 0 to 0.6.  The regions to the far right are the four municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, and Chongqing. The vertical axis (also measured in 10,000 yuan, but ranging from 0 to 
4.0) shows the housing price of each region in 2013.  The best fit to the points is curvilinear, 
curving upwards. Areas with initially higher house prices benefited from proportionately faster 
house price inflation.  
[Table 4.15 about here] 
[Table 4.16 about here] 
[Figure 4.8 about here] 
     Table 4.16 shows the impact of house price inflation on the Gini coefficient. Columns A 
and B report the Gini as previously estimated. Column C reports the Gini for 2013 if wealth is 
deflated by the relative rise in house prices between 2002 and 2013. Column D shows the rise in 
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the undeflated Gini over the eleven years (B-C). Columns E and F measure the contributions to 
the rise in the Gini that are due to the rise in house prices (B-C) and to other factors (C-A). 
Relative house price inflation accounted for 55 percent of the rise in urban China, 17 percent in 
rural China, and 45 percent at the national level. Again, the excess of house price inflation over 
consumer price inflation is very important to our story. 
     An underlying question that deserves further research is the following:  Why has house 
price inflation been so rapid? One possible explanation is the rapid increase in demand for 
housing and housing land in relation to its supply. Another possibility is that the housing market 
has grown stronger over time. Part of the house price inflation during this period might have 
represented some market undervaluation in 2002 and subsequent movement toward equilibrium 
market values. 
 
C. Differential Savings 
Another channel by which wealth inequality can increase is through differential savings: the rich 
might save a higher proportion of their income than the poor. Savings is defined as disposable 
income per capita minus consumption per capita, with imputed rent excluded from both income 
and consumption. Expenditures on consumer durables are not part of measured consumption; 
instead they are treated as an addition to wealth.  
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[Table 4.17 about here] 
[Table 4.18 about here] 
     Table 4.17 and Figure 4.9 show the savings rate (i.e., saving as a percentage of income) by 
income per capita decile, and Table 4.18 and Figure 4.10 do the same for wealth per capita. 
Table 4.17 displays a monotonic rise in the savings rate in all six columns as we move up the 
income deciles. At the national level, in 2002 the savings rate rose from ‒15.8 percent in the 
lowest decile to 31.7 percent in the highest decile, and in 2013 it rose from ‒51.8 percent to 57.2 
percent. Some negative savings is to be expected in the lowest decile if there is transient poverty. 
     Similarly, there is a general upward trend in the savings rate as we move up the wealth per 
capita deciles. For instance, at the national level in 2002 the savings rate rises from 0.7 percent in 
the lowest wealth decile to 20.8 percent in the highest wealth decile; the corresponding figures in 
2013 are 17.3 percent and 48.7 percent respectively. In both years the difference in the savings 
rate between the lowest and the highest wealth deciles exceeds 20 percentage points. 
     In general, even though wealthy households might on average be closer to their target 
wealth levels, the wealthier tend to accumulate more quickly. Thus, households with higher 
income and those with higher wealth save a higher proportion of their income. These disparities 
in savings rates contribute to the rising inequality of wealth among households. 
[Figure 4.9 about here] 
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[Figure 4.10 about here] 
 
D. The Ratio of Wealth Income to Non-Wealth Income 
Piketty (2014) examines the ratio of wealth to income (β) over time: β = K/Y. Income from 
wealth (Yk) is a proportion (α) of national income: α = Yk/Y. This can be expressed as α = rβ 
where r is the rate of return on wealth. The proportion α increases, by definition, if the return on 
wealth exceeds the growth rate of income (i.e., if r > g). Piketty argues that as α, the share of Yk, 
rises, the inequality of wealth increases. As wealth accumulates, the income derived from wealth 
also rises. If the savings rate for income from wealth is higher than that for income from 
non-wealth, this generates proportionately faster growth of wealth for those with more of their 
income derived from wealth. Thus, ceteris paribus, if the savings rate of households is greater, 
their ratio of wealth income to total income is higher. Piketty (2014) regards this mechanism as 
an important explanation for the rise in wealth inequality in the advanced economies. 
     Nevertheless, this effect is unlikely to be important in the Chinese case. We define income 
from wealth as interest, dividends, and rent received.4 In 2002, the proportion of income from 
wealth was very low, at 4.6 percent for the urban sample, 3.0 percent for the rural sample, and 
                              
4 We exclude imputed rent because it dominates the series, especially in the lower income deciles, 
and imputed wealth income is unlikely to affect savings to the same extent as wealth income 
received. 
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for the two combined it was 3.6 percent; in 2013, the corresponding figures were 9.5 percent, 4.0 
percent, and 6.3 percent respectively (Table 4.19). Thus, it is to be expected that in 2002 the 
proportion of income from wealth would have a negligible effect on savings, and even in 2013 it 
had only a small effect.  
  [Table 4.19 about here] 
[Table 4.20 about here] 
[Figure 4.11 about here] 
     Is the proportion of income from wealth as a percentage of total income related to income 
level? Table 4.20 and Figure 4.11 report this proportion by household income per capita decile. 
Beyond the first decile, the proportion increases little as we move up the deciles in 2002 but it 
tends to increase more in 2013. For instance, for the 2013 national sample the share rose from 
3.8 percent in the lowest three income deciles to 8.7 percent in the highest three deciles. 
However, even in 2013 the effect was modest. 
     To further examine Piketty’s argument, we estimated the OLS equations with the savings 
rate as the dependent variable and the share of income from wealth as an explanatory variable. In 
2013 at least, there is a higher propensity to save out of income from wealth than out of other 
income. However, this significant positive coefficient on income from wealth may be a 
non-causal association resulting from the positive relation between the share of income from 
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wealth and income on the one hand and between income and the savings rate on the other. 
Indeed, the addition of income per capita in the estimated equation removed the significant 
positive effect of the share of income from wealth. 
        Table 4.20 and Figure 4.11 show that China’s proportion of income from wealth, although 
rising with income, is not sufficiently large to have a substantial effect on income inequality. 
However, income from wealth is defined as income from interest, profits, and rents, and it does 
not take account of income in the form of capital gains derived from the increase in real house 
prices. The rate of house price inflation relative to consumer price inflation averaged 14.9 
percent per annum. Recall that housing wealth constitutes the major part of total household 
wealth, being 53 percent of wealth in 2002 and 73 percent in 2013 (Table 4.3).  
     The NBS data indicate the average household real income per capita increased by 10 
percent per annum between 2002 and 2013. It is therefore plausible that when real house price 
inflation is included, the annual return on wealth exceeded the growth of income (r > g). 
Moreover, it may be the case that the capital gains from housing wealth increase with income per 
capita. This is apparent from Table 4.21 and Figure 4.12, which show, by income per capita 
decile, the percentage increase in real house price inflation (derived for each household by the 
method explained above) over the eleven-year period in urban areas, rural areas, and China as a 
whole. In the urban sample, the relationship is U-shaped but the percentage increase rises with 
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income beyond the fourth income decile. Owing to changing weights, the rise is more 
pronounced at the national level. For instance, this rise is from 134 percent in income per capita 
decile 1 to 202 percent in income per capita decile 10.  
[Table 4.21 about here] 
[Figure 4.12 about here]  
        If we accept Hicks’s (1946, p. 178) concept of income, real capital gains during a period 
are included as income. Thus, a rise in real housing wealth is a part of income. We have shown 
that as conventionally measured this rise increases proportionately with income. Once the role of 
real house price inflation is considered, it is possible that r > g. If that is the case, then Piketty’s 
mechanism would be relevant in China. 
 
X.  Corrections for Under-representation and Under-reporting in 2013 
 
China has enough dollar billionaires to influence measures of income and wealth distribution if 
they are included in the national household surveys on which the estimates of inequality are 
based. However, it is most unlikely that they are included and, if any are indeed included, their 
wealth would be accurately recorded. It is worth exploring scientific ways of correcting for 
survey inaccuracies near the top of the income distribution.   
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     Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011), using income tax data for the major economies, 
attempt to measure the income share of the top 5, or 1, or 0.1 percent. They identify these precise 
top shares by imputing them using the Pareto distribution. They use the actual distribution below 
5 (or 1, or 0.1) percent but apply the Pareto distribution for the top incomes. Their justification is 
that “a number of top income studies conclude that the Pareto approximation works remarkably 
well.” 
     The Pareto law for top incomes is given by the cumulative density function F(y): 
       1 – F(y) = (k/y)α  (k > 0, α >0) 
where α is the Pareto parameter. The corresponding density function f(y) is: 
             F(y) = αkα/y (1 +α) 
The key property of the Pareto distributions is that the ratio of average income y*(y) of 
individuals with income above y, to y, does not depend on the income threshold y. 
               y* = αy/(α – 1) 
i.e.,                 y* (y)/y = β = α/(α-1) 
Thus, if we know β, we can calculate α. A higher value of β implies a fatter upper tail.  
Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011) assume that records are accurate (i.e., there is no 
non-responses and no under-reporting), but our concern is to conduct simulations that assume 
under-representation and under-reporting. 
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     Consider first correcting for under-representation. Given that the top households tend to 
avoid a survey of this sort, reweighting can be used to correct for this non-response bias. Assume 
that the non-response rate among the top wealth households is 50 percent. We can then expand 
the top 5 percent of households to become the top 7.5/102.5 = 7.32 percent, and then get a new 
frequency distribution of household wealth.  This involves randomly repeating every second 
high-wealth household. It is then possible to calculate the Gini with the assumed non-response 
uncorrected and corrected, and to measure the sensitivity of the Gini to this assumption. 
     Table 4.22 reports the results of this exercise. The rows indicate the top percentile to be 
expanded. The first row shows no expansion, then expansion of the top 0.5 percent, 1.0 percent, 
and 5.0 percent of the wealth distribution. The columns show the mean values of the simulated 
sample and its Gini coefficient if the top sub-sample is first doubled and then tripled. Consider 
the effect of doubling the number of wealthy households. The Gini coefficient of the actual 
sample is 0.62. It rises to 0.65 when the top 5 percent of households is doubled in number. If a 
tripling is assumed instead, the Gini rises to 0.67 in the case of the top 1 percent of households 
but it falls to 0.66 in the case of the top 5 percent.  As a kernel density function suggests, 
beyond about 1 percent of the households a tripling of the top households begins to dilute 
inequality. 
[Table 4.22 about here] 
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     Now consider correcting for under-reporting of wealth by respondents. Semi-parametric 
analysis can be used: actual data below the top x percent and simulated data for the top x percent, 
with values taken from the corresponding Pareto function. The observed and the simulated 
frequencies should be the same at the changeover point. We now have the means to correct for 
possible under-reporting of household wealth. The actual value of β is derived from the survey.  
A higher value—a fatter tail— can be assumed on the assumption that there is under-reporting.  
     Table 4.23 shows four rows. In the first row by assumption there is no 
under-representation of the wealthy, i.e., no expansion of the richest sub-sample takes place. In 
the other three rows, it is assumed that the number of those in the top 0.5 percent, 1.0 percent, 
and 5.0 percent respectively of the sample are tripled. The value of β in the actual sample is 1.51. 
Column 1 shows the results if the value of β takes almost its actual value (assumed β=1.5); 
column 2 assumes a fatter tail (β=2.0) owing to the assumed under-reporting of wealth; and 
column 3 shows a still fatter tail. 
[Table 4.23 about here] 
     As might be expected, simply replacing the actual data with simulated data has a 
negligible effect on the Gini coefficient. This is evident in the Gini value (0. 613) of the (first 
row, first column) cell in the table. Looking across the first row, the Gini coefficient increases 
from 0.62 (actual distribution) to 0.64 when β=2.0 and to 0.66 when β=0.25. This row shows the 
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degree of sensitivity of the Gini to possible under-reporting. When the assumption of 
under-reporting is combined with the assumption of under-representation, the effect is magnified. 
Consider a tripling of the top 1 percent of wealthy households (row 3). The Gini rises from 0.67 
with the actual value of β to 0.69 with β=2.0 and to 0.71 with β=2.5. On that last assumption, the 
Gini coefficient is 9 percentage points above its reported value. Expanding the top 5 percent is 
again found to dilute inequality. 
     The table cannot produce the “true, corrected” Gini coefficient of wealth. However, it does 
show considerable sensitivity of the Gini to plausible assumptions of the degree of 
under-representation of wealthy households and under-reporting by wealthy households. 
     A different method of correcting for underrepresentation at the top of China’s wealth 
distribution is employed by Xie and Jin (2015). They use the Hurun Rich List 2012, which 
reported the wealth of the one thousand richest households in China. The Pareto distribution was 
then applied to estimate the wealth of the top 0.1 percent and, with the appropriate weights, this 
was combined with the wealth data from the CFPS national survey of 2012 for the remaining 
99.9 percent of households (Xie and Jin 2015, p. 209). The unadjusted Gini coefficient of wealth 
among households was estimated to be 0.64 and the Gini adjusted for underrepresentation at the 
top was 0.73—a difference of 9 percentage points (Xie and Jin 2015, table 2). Their estimates 
correspond well to our unadjusted Gini in 2013 (0.62) and our adjusted estimate when based on 
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the assumptions that the top 1 percent is tripled and that β = 2.5 (0.71)—also a difference of 9 
percentage points. 
 
XI. Conclusion 
 
Between 2002 and 2013 (real) household net wealth per capita in China increased by 17 percent 
per annum, and net housing wealth increased by no less than 20 percent per annum. Our 
comparison of China’s inequality of household wealth per capita in the two years shows that this 
inequality rose rapidly in the twenty-first century. For instance, the share of the top wealth decile 
increased from 37 percent to 48 percent of the total wealth. A decomposition of the sources of 
wealth inequality show the immense importance of net housing in the share of wealth and in the 
contribution to wealth inequality, and in its rise over time: the share rose from 53 to 73 percent 
and the contribution rose from 64 to 79 percent.  
     This chapter may be one of the first attempts not only to describe China’s rapidly rising 
inequality of wealth but also to explain the phenomenon. Setting aside the poorest income groups, 
we found a tendency for the wealth/income ratio to rise with income in 2013, and for the 
wealth/income ratio to rise sharply over the eleven-year period under examination. The rise in 
relative house values played a key role in widening the distribution of wealth. The tendency for 
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savings to rise with income and to rise with wealth provides a mechanism whereby wealth 
inequality will grow, with those having more income and more proportional wealth savings y 
and thus accumulating wealth more rapidly. Although Piketty (2014) emphasizes higher savings 
out of wealth income in his explanation of rising wealth inequality in the advanced economies, 
China’s income from wealth as a share of the total income is still small and so its effects on 
savings can only be minor. However, if we regard real capital gains as part of income, Piketty’s 
mechanism has credence in China. 
     Although China’s inequality of income, as evidenced by the 2007 and 2013 CHIP surveys, 
now seems to be on the decline, we have suggested reasons to expect that the inequality of 
wealth will continue to rise. This rising inequality is a phenomenon of growing socioeconomic 
importance, and it deserves more extensive study in the future.  
     Possible policy implications also deserve attention. These might include reform of the 
banking and financial systems: reform can have the effect of reducing inequality in terms of 
opportunities to secure access to funds, and thus at least to reduce unfair wealth inequality. It is 
worth exploring the feasibility of introducing serious wealth and inheritance taxes. Corruption 
among the powerful is likely to have increased wealth inequality. The current anticorruption 
campaign, as described by Manion (2016), which was introduced in 2013, is likely to temper the 
rise in wealth inequality which otherwise would stem from corruption. 
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Appendix.  The Measurement of Wealth per Capita in CHIP 2002 and CHIP 2013 
 
In all cases we divide each component of wealth by the number of household members to obtain 
household wealth per capita. For 2002 we follow very closely the definitions set out in the data 
appendix to Zhao and Ding (2008, pp. 140‒144). The definitions used in 2013 are set out below. 
 
A. Net Housing Value 
Net housing value is calculated as the housing value minus housing loans. As a few households 
(3.5 percent of all households) have more than one house, we sum the net value for each 
household—the reported market value of both owner-occupied and any other owned housing. 
For those who report housing area but not housing value, we multiply by the average value per 
square meter in the county. Those who have no ownership rights but report housing area are 
recorded as having a housing value of zero.  
 
B. Net Financial Assets 
The questionnaire asks separately about the total value of financial assets and about the separate 
components. Where the sum of the components is not equal to the reported total value, we use 
the sum of the components. Financial assets include spot cash, demand deposits, time deposits, 
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endowment insurance, government bonds, other bonds, stocks, funds, futures, money lent (but 
not including business loans), and other financial assets.  
 
C. Non-housing Debt 
Comparing reported gross non-housing debt with the sum value of its components, we use the 
value of the debt components when the two are not equal. Missing values are treated as zero.  
 
D. Fixed Productive Assets 
We take the estimated net present value of agricultural and non-agricultural fixed productive 
assets as reported in the questionnaire to record the fixed productive assets. 
 
E. Consumer Durables 
We take the estimated market value of households’ “movable properties” from the questionnaire 
as the value of consumer durables, which comprises private (non-business) cars and various 
other consumer durables.  
 
F. Rural Land Value 
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The variable household net agricultural income, recorded in the NBS survey, is used to calculate 
the rural land value in 2013. However, because we lack direct information on the net household 
agricultural income in 2002, we follow Zhao and Ding (2008) in assuming that one acre of 
irrigated land equals two acres of dry land, and we calculate the net household agricultural 
income as the gross agricultural income minus production costs.   Furthermore, following 
earlier research we assume that 25 percent of the net agricultural income comes from land and 
the return rate of land is 8 percent (McKinley 1993; Zhao and Ding 2008). Therefore, we derive 
the land value from the net household agricultural income times 25/8.  
 
G. Other Assets 
The questionnaire items “other precious metals and jewellery (including gold ornaments)” and 
“other assets” are not included in the financial assets or the fixed productive assets or the 
consumer durables. Accordingly, we define these items as our “other assets” variable. 
 
H. Total Net Wealth 
The total value of net wealth is the sum of the wealth components listed and defined above: net 
housing wealth, net financial assets, non-housing debt, fixed productive assets, consumer 
durables, rural land value, and other assets. 
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Table 4.1. Gini coefficient of wealth and income inequality 
 Household level Household per capita level 
 
Actual 
CPI 
adjusted 
PPP+CPI 
adjusted 
Actual 
CPI 
adjusted 
PPP+CPI 
adjusted 
2002 wealth 0.453 0.441 0.402 0.506 0.494 0.445 
2013 wealth 0.583 0.583 0.541 0.617 0.617 0.574 
2002 income 0.384 0.371 0.329 0.437 0.424 0.370 
2013 income 0.417 0.417 0.388 0.433 0.433 0.400 
Source: In this and all subsequent tables and figures the estimates for 2002 are derived from the 
2002 CHIP survey and the estimates for 2013 are derived from the 2013 CHIP survey.   
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Table 4.2. Level and growth of wealth per capita 
Category 
Actual 
2002 
(A) 
CPI adjusted 
2002 
（B） 
PPP+CPI 
adjusted 
2002 
（C） 
Actual 
2013 
（D） 
PPP 
adjusted 
2013     
（E） 
Annual real 
growth rate, 
2002‒2013   
F=(D-B) 
Urban       
Overall net wealth 36764 49517 36042 273841 195607 16.8 
Financial assets 9921 13357 9731 38996 28697 10.2 
Net housing 22639 30483 22146 214021 151423 19.4 
Productive fixed assets 712 973 761 4041 3181 13.8 
Consumer durables 3088 4160 3006 15071 11085 12.4 
Other assets 648 878 652 2334 1708 9.3 
Non-housing debt -244 -334 -254 -622 -487 5.8 
Rural 
      
Overall net wealth 13666 19576 20521 83489 80127 14.1 
Land 3862 5590 5903 8263 8297 3.6 
Financial assets 2076 2972 3122 16112 15906 16.6 
Net housing 5680 8074 8406 49336 46430 17.9 
Productive fixed assets 1192 1722 1812 4931 4772 10.0 
Consumer durables 1072 1529 1602 5690 5550 12.7 
Non-housing debt -216 -311 -324 -843 -828 9.5 
National 
      
Overall net wealth 21565 29815 25829 162829 128261 16.7 
Land 2541 3678 3884 4819 4839 2.5 
Financial assets 4759 6523 5382 25650 21238 13.3 
Net housing 11480 15738 13105 117978 90192 20.1 
Productive fixed assets 1027 1466 1452 4560 4109 10.9 
Consumer durables 1761 2429 2083 9600 7857 13.3 
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Other assets 222 300 223 973 712 11.3 
Non-housing debt -225 -319 -300 -751 -686 8.1 
Notes: In this and all subsequent tables and figures wealth is defined as household wealth per 
capita. A comparison with the NBS macroeconomic data on total household financial savings (47 
trillion yuan) in 2013 suggests that the survey estimate of household per capita financial savings 
when multiplied by the population (3.5 trillion yuan) is an understatement. 
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Table 4.3. Structure of household wealth by type of wealth asset (%) 
Category 
Urban Rural National 
2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 
Overall net wealth 100 100 100 100 100.0 100.0 
Land - - 28.6 9.9 12.3 3.0 
Financial assets 27.0 14.2 15.2 19.3 21.9 15.8 
Net housing 61.6 78.2 41.2 59.1 52.8 72.5 
Productive fixed assets 2.0 1.5 8.8 5.9 4.9 2.8 
Consumer durables 8.4 5.5 7.8 6.8 8.1 5.9 
Other assets 1.8 0.9 - - 1.0 0.6 
Non-housing debt -0.7 -0.2 -1.6 -1.0 -1.1 -0.5 
Notes: In this and all subsequent tables and figures we show only the CPI deflated wealth, i.e., 
both the 2002 and the 2013 wealth are reported in constant 2013 prices. 
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Table 4.4. Household wealth share by wealth decile (%) 
Wealth 
decile from 
lowest to 
highest 
Urban Rural National 
National wealth per 
capita (yuan) 
2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 
1 0.4 0.6 2.2 0.7 1.2 0.4 3742 7688 
2 2.0 1.9 3.8 2.1 2.6 1.4 8223 22575 
3 3.6 2.8 5.0 3.1 3.6 2.2 11584 33397 
4 5.0 3.8 6.1 4.1 4.6 3.0 15003 45232 
5 6.5 4.9 7.2 5.2 5.7 4.0 18858 59417 
6 8.3 6.4 8.6 6.6 7.0 5.4 23577 77474 
7 10.5 8.4 10.1 8.3 8.9 7.4 30210 104428 
8 13.6 11.6 12.3 11.0 11.8 10.7 40365 148946 
9 18.5 17.9 15.8 16.4 17.5 17.2 59001 238683 
10 31.5 41.8 29.0 42.7 37.1 48.4 119630 701955 
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Table 4.5. Wealth Gini coefficients, 2002 and 2013 
Sample 2002 2013 
Change 2002‒2013 
Percentage points Percentage 
Urban 0.472 0.557 0.09 18.03 
Rural 0.384 0.548 0.16 42.54 
National 0.494 0.617 0.12 25.06 
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Table 4.6. The sensitivity of wealth level and wealth inequality to the tails of the wealth 
distribution 
Category Wealth level (yuan) Wealth inequality (Gini) 
 2002 2013 2002 2013 
Entire sample 29815 162829 0.494 0.617 
Excluding highest 1% 27971 144433 0.470 0.581 
Excluding highest 5% 23905 113573 0.419 0.518 
Excluding highest 10% 20848 93429 0.380 0.473 
Excluding lowest 1% 30147 164693 0.487 0.611 
Excluding lowest 5% 31289 171358 0.472 0.598 
Excluding lowest 10% 32733 180135 0.456 0.582 
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Table 4.7. Household wealth share by income per capita decile (%) 
Income per capita 
decile from lowest 
to highest 
Urban Rural National 
2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 
1 4.2 3.0 4.2 5.2 2.9 2.9 
2 5.4 3.7 5.3 4.7 4.1 2.8 
3 6.0 4.8 6.4 5.3 4.9 3.3 
4 7.2 5.6 7.3 5.8 6.0 4.4 
5 8.7 6.6 8.0 7.3 7.1 5.2 
6 9.5 8.2 9.0 7.8 8.4 6.8 
7 10.5 9.9 10.3 9.8 10.5 9.0 
8 12.0 12.2 11.8 11.8 13.4 12.1 
9 14.7 16.6 14.8 16.4 16.3 17.5 
10 21.9 29.5 23.0 25.9 26.6 36.1 
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Table 4.8. Household wealth inequality and its decomposition, 2002 
 
Category 
Wealth 
structure 
Gini 
index 
Concentration 
rate 
Contribution to 
overall wealth 
inequality 
Urban Financial assets 0.269 0.596 0.707 0.237 
Net housing 0.617 0.561 0.911 0.661 
Productive fixed assets 0.021 0.982 0.626 0.027 
Consumer durables 0.084 0.555 0.566 0.056 
Other assets 0.017 0.913 0.411 0.014 
Non-housing debt -0.008 -0.975 0.365 0.006 
Rural Land 0.281 0.455 0.522 0.172 
Financial assets 0.155 0.641 0.755 0.193 
Net housing 0.416 0.533 0.843 0.481 
Productive fixed assets 0.087 0.675 0.594 0.089 
Consumer durables 0.078 0.466 0.642 0.060 
Non-housing debt -0.016 -0.918 0.140 0.005 
National Land 0.101 0.691 0.004 0.001 
Financial assets 0.228 0.688 0.796 0.250 
Net housing 0.545 0.636 0.914 0.636 
Productive fixed assets 0.044 0.847 0.424 0.032 
Consumer durables 0.082 0.569 0.672 0.063 
Other assets 0.011 0.963 0.625 0.014 
Non-housing debt -0.011 -0.951 0.254 0.005 
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Table 4.9. Household wealth inequality and its decomposition, 2013 
 Category 
Wealth 
structure 
Gini 
index 
Concentration 
rate 
Contribution to 
overall wealth 
inequality 
Urban Financial assets 0.145 0.606 0.681 0.108 
Net housing 0.778 0.608 0.967 0.828 
Productive fixed assets 0.016 0.979 0.608 0.017 
Consumer durables 0.055 0.704 0.580 0.041 
Other assets 0.008 0.765 0.451 0.005 
Non-housing debt -0.003 -1.482 0.201 0.001 
Rural Land 0.114 0.552 0.412 0.050 
Financial assets 0.189 0.618 0.730 0.164 
Net housing 0.580 0.635 0.907 0.646 
Productive fixed assets 0.061 0.909 0.699 0.075 
Consumer durables 0.067 0.728 0.648 0.061 
Non-housing debt -0.011 -1.085 0.215 0.005 
National Land 0.039 0.714 -0.012 -0.001 
Financial assets 0.160 0.647 0.763 0.130 
Net housing 0.711 0.702 0.960 0.785 
Productive fixed assets 0.031 0.942 0.608 0.029 
Consumer durables 0.059 0.746 0.685 0.049 
Other assets 0.006 0.915 0.695 0.006 
Non-housing debt -0.005 -1.212 0.203 0.002 
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Table 4.10. National wealth inequality decomposition: Urban and rural 
Year Index 
National 
inequality 
Within-group 
inequality 
Between-group 
inequality 
2002 
Theil index 0.429 0.332 0.096 
Proportion (%) 100 77.5 22.5 
2013 
Theil index 0.728 0.547 0.182 
Proportion (%) 100 75.1 24.9 
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Table 4.11. Wealth/income ratio by income per capita decile 
Income per capita 
decile from lowest 
to highest 
Urban Rural National 
2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 
1 6.4 9.5 7.1 11.5 6.6 11.2 
2 5.1 7.3 5.7 9.0 5.6 8.1 
3 4.7 7.4 5.5 7.5 5.1 6.8 
4 4.7 7.1 5.3 6.6 5.0 6.9 
5 4.8 7.3 5.0 6.7 4.7 6.4 
6 4.5 7.7 4.8 5.9 4.5 6.4 
7 4.5 8.1 4.7 6.2 4.6 6.6 
8 4.4 8.4 4.4 5.8 4.5 6.7 
9 4.2 9.0 4.3 5.9 4.3 7.0 
10 4.2 9.6 4.0 4.5 4.1 7.9 
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Table 4.12. Housing wealth/income ratio by income per capita decile 
Income per capita 
decile from lowest 
to highest 
Urban Rural National 
2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 
1 4.4 6.9 3.1 7.7 2.8 7.3 
2 3.3 5.6 2.3 5.3 2.4 4.8 
3 3.0 5.8 2.2 4.4 2.2 4.0 
4 3.0 5.5 2.1 3.6 2.2 4.0 
5 3.0 5.7 2.0 3.9 2.2 4.0 
6 2.9 6.0 1.8 3.3 2.3 4.3 
7 2.8 6.3 1.8 3.5 2.5 4.8 
8 2.7 6.8 1.7 3.5 2.6 5.0 
9 2.5 7.2 1.8 3.8 2.5 5.3 
10 2.4 7.6 1.8 2.7 2.4 6.1 
 
 
 
  
57 
 
Table 4.13. Wealth level and annual percentage increase by income per capita decile 
Income per 
capita decile 
from lowest 
to highest 
Urban Rural National 
2002 2013 
Increase per 
annum 
2002‒2013 
(%) 
2002 2013 
Increase 
per annum 
2002‒2013 
(%) 
2002 2013 
Increase 
per annum 
2002‒2013 
(%) 
1 21064 77822 12.6 8365 40334 15.4 9195 43208 15.1 
2 26940 98446 12.5 10673 36102 11.7 13176 40231 10.7 
3 30411 128693 14.0 12846 40218 10.9 15781 47325 10.5 
4 36222 147125 13.6 14725 43739 10.4 19487 62470 11.2 
5 43703 177166 13.6 16236 53904 11.5 22985 75292 11.4 
6 46781 219433 15.1 18303 57839 11.0 27328 95799 12.1 
7 54147 266466 15.6 21183 74994 12.2 34705 127277 12.5 
8 60823 329424 16.6 23936 86381 12.4 43783 169678 13.1 
9 72324 449767 18.1 30106 118358 13.3 54507 239901 14.4 
10 109256 792049 19.7 46450 173419 12.7 87791 501407 17.2 
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Table 4.14. Growth of net sousing per capita: Simulation with deflated house prices 
 
Level of household wealth 
Change in 
housing 
wealth 
2002‒2013 
Contribution to change in 
housing wealth (%) 
Sample 2002 2013 
2013(housing 
price deflated) 
Housing 
price 
Housing 
quantity 
 (A) (B) (C) (B-A) (B-C)/(B-A) (C-A)/(B-A) 
Urban 30483 214021 73322 183538 76.7 23.3 
Rural 8074 49336 19618 41261 72.0 28.0 
National 15738 117978 42002 102240 74.3 25.7 
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Table 4.15. Growth of household net wealth per capita, 2002–2013: Simulation with deflated 
house prices 
 
Level of household wealth 
Change in 
wealth  
2002‒2013 
(B‒A) 
Contribution to change in wealth 
(%) 
Sample 
2002 
(A) 
2013 
(B) 
2013 (house price 
deflated) (C) 
House price 
(B‒C)/(B‒A) 
Other 
(C‒A)/(B‒A) 
Urban 49517 273840 133786 224323 62.4 37.6 
Rural 19575 83488 53747 63913 46.5 53.5 
National 29815 162829 87108 133014 56.9 43.1 
 
  
60 
 
Table 4.16. Impact of relative house price inflation on wealth inequality 
 
Gini coefficient of household wealth Change in 
Gini 2002‒
2013 
D=(B‒A) 
Contribution to change in 
Gini (%) 
Sample 
2002 
(A) 
2013 
(B) 
2013(house price 
deflated) 
(C) 
House price 
inflation 
(B-C)/(B-A) 
Other 
(C‒A)/(B‒
A) 
Urban 0.472 0.557 0.510 0.085 55.1 44.9 
Rural 0.384 0.548 0.520 0.164 17.2 82.8 
National 0.494 0.617 0.561 0.124 45.3 54.7 
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Table 4.17. Savings rate by income per capita decile (%) 
Income decile from 
lowest to highest 
Urban Rural National 
2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 
1 ‒2.6 7.0 ‒29.8 ‒65.9 ‒15.8 ‒51.8 
2 9.1 32.8 7.0 ‒12.2 11.5 1.1 
3 13.8 38.9 12.9 6.5 18.9 17.4 
4 16.1 41.3 17.9 16.1 25.8 25.5 
5 19.9 42.4 21.9 22.1 26.6 31.3 
6 22.7 46.6 28.9 29.3 26.0 38.2 
7 23.4 48.2 33.8 31.7 24.3 43.6 
8 23.9 50.2 33.0 39.9 26.1 44.8 
9 27.3 53.5 34.9 46.8 27.2 49.3 
10 34.2 60.1 38.8 52.6 31.7 57.2 
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Table 4.18. Savings rate by wealth per capita decile (%) 
Wealth decile from 
lowest to highest 
Urban Rural National 
2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 
1 20.9 37.6 6.9 31.2 11.5 31.6 
2 23.4 40.4 10.9 29.2 13.1 31.4 
3 23.4 43.9 13.1 30.8 14.5 32.5 
4 25.2 43.3 13 30.8 16.4 34.3 
5 24.4 45.2 16 33.1 18.5 37.8 
6 25.3 43.9 16.7 34.5 20.9 38.3 
7 25.8 44.3 18.4 37.1 22.5 41.6 
8 27.5 44.6 20 36.1 24.3 43.4 
9 26.8 49.4 22.1 40 26 44.6 
10 28.6 53 24.7 45.7 28.1 50.0 
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Table 4.19. Income from wealth as share of household income  
 Urban Rural National 
2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 
Percentage (%) 4.64 9.54 3.04 4.04 3.59 6.34 
Note: We use CPI-deflated wealth and income, both household per capita. Income from wealth is 
here defined as interest, dividends, and actual rent. 
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Table 4.20. Share of income from wealth in total income by income per capita decile 
Income decile from 
lowest to highest 
Urban Rural National 
2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 
1 4.4 9.6 3.4 5.6 3.2 5.5 
2 4.7 8.1 2.7 2.6 2.5 3.1 
3 4.2 8.5 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.9 
4 4.7 8.8 2.3 2.1 2.8 3.5 
5 4.3 8.5 2.7 2.8 3.3 4.7 
6 4.5 9.9 2.6 2.6 3.8 6.2 
7 4.5 10.3 2.5 3.6 4.3 7.2 
8 4.2 10.1 3.3 4.8 4.5 8.1 
9 5.1 10.6 4.0 5.9 4.5 8.6 
10 5.9 11.0 4.8 5.5 5.5 9.5 
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Table 4.21. Real housing growth rate by income per capita decile in 2002 (%) 
Income decile from lowest to 
highest Urban Rural National 
1 183.0 132.0 133.6 
2 178.4 132.7 136.6 
3 177.2 133.7 135.5 
4 171.0 131.8 145.8 
5 177.3 132.0 149.1 
6 177.4 136.8 161.9 
7 185.7 134.1 163.9 
8 192.3 133.9 172.2 
9 201.0 139.5 186.3 
10 207.6 139.6 202.4 
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Table 4.22. Simulated correction for non-response by the wealthy in 2013 
 Top sub-sample doubled Top sub-sample tripled 
 Mean Gini Mean Gini 
No expansion 162829 0.617 162829 0.617 
Expand top 0.5% 176310 0.639 189621 0.657 
Expand top 1% 183888 0.647 204423 0.668 
Expand top 5% 212058 0.650 255719 0.657 
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Table 4.23. Simulated correction for non-response plus under-reporting by the wealthy in 
2013 
The top sub-sample is 
tripled 
β=1.5 β=2.0 β=2.5 
Mean Gini Mean Gini Mean Gini 
No expansion 160679 0.613 172353 0.637 184028 0.659 
Expand top 0.5% 190583 0.659 201664 0.677 212745 0.693 
Expand top 1% 205039 0.669 222775 0.694 240511 0.715 
Expand top 5% 256270 0.657 272737 0.677 289204 0.694 
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Figure 4.1. Wealth Lorenz curves for urban households 
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Figure 4.2. Wealth Lorenz curves for rural households 
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Figure 4.3. Wealth Lorenz curves for national households 
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Figure 4.4. Household wealth share by income per capita decile 
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Figure 4.5. Wealth/income ratio by income per capita decile 
 
 
  
73 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Housing wealth/income ratio per income per capita decile 
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Figure 4.7. Annual percentage increase in wealth by income per capita decile 
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Figure 4.8. Housing prices by common area in 2002 and 2013 
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Figure 4.9. Savings rate by income per capita decile (%) 
  
Urban  2002
Urban  2013
Rural  2002
Rural  2013
National  2002
National  2013
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Figure 4.10. Savings rate by wealth per capita decile (%) 
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Figure 4.11. Share of income from wealth in total income by income per capita decile 
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Figure 4.12. Growth rate of real housing prices by income per capita decile (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
